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Abstract 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is an evolving multi-hop, ubiquitous and high 
speed networking technology. In this thesis, we proposed a secure micropayment 
scheme for network access in WMNs. The main motivation is that the operators are not 
considered as fully trusted entities in our scheme; the clients control their balance with 
their operators. In this way, none of the system entities can behave dishonestly about the 
amount of services provided and obtained.  
Our proposed payment scheme is a prepaid one. The users obtain connection 
cards for getting service. Connection card issuer, which is a trusted third party, 
generates the connection cards. Each connection card includes tokens. These tokens are 
generated as a hash chain which is obtained by hashing an initial value (IV) several 
times. Hash functions are one way and irreversible cryptographic functions. The tokens 
are consumed backwards. Therefore, it is not feasible to generate unused tokens from an 
already used token. This property is the main enabler for the security of our scheme.  
We have conducted simulations for performance evaluation of the proposed 
scheme. Our results show that in a network with 300 clients, the average authentication 
completion time becomes less than 1 second even if all the clients send their connection 
request at the same time.  
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KABLOSUZ ÖRGÜ AĞLARI ĐÇĐN ÖN ÖDEMELĐ GÜVENLĐ MĐKROÖDEME 
ŞEMASI 
Can Yücel 
Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2010 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Albert Levi 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ön Ödemeli Sistemler, Güvenlik, Mikro Ödeme, Kablosuz Örgü 
Ağlar 
Özet 
Kablosuz Örgü Ağlar çok sekmeli, erişimin her yerden sağlanabildiği, yüksek 
hızlı ve gelişmekte olan bir ağ teknolojisidir. Bu tezde kablosuz örgü ağlarda ağ erişimi 
için güvenli bir mikro ödeme sistemi teklif edilmiştir. Şemamızdaki ana motivasyon, 
operatörlerin tamamen güvenilir birimler olmadığı yönündedir; buna göre müşteriler 
operatörlerle olan hesaplarını kendileri kontrol altına almaktadır. Bu sayede, sistem 
elemanlarının hiç birisi sağlanan veya alınan hizmet karşısında dürüst olmayan bir 
davranış sergileyememektedir. 
Önerdiğimiz ödeme sistemi ön ödemeli bir şemadır. Kullanıcılar bağlantı kartları 
sayesinde servis alırlar. Bağlantı kartları düzenleyicisi, güvenilir bir üçüncü parti 
kuruluştur ve bağlantı kartlarının yaratılmasından sorumludur. Her bir bağlantı kartı 
jetonlardan oluşur. Bu jetonlar özet zinciri olarak yaratılır. Özet zinciri başlangıç 
değerinin bir kaç defa özetlenmesi ile oluşur. Özet fonksiyonları tek yönlü ve geri 
alınamayan kriptografik fonksiyonlardır. Jetonlar ise geriye doğru tüketilir. Bu sayede 
kullanılmış jetonlardan kullanılmamış jetonların üretilmesi mümkün değildir. Bu özellik 
şemamızdaki güvenliği sağlayan ana özelliktir. 
Önerdiğimiz şemanın performans değerlendirmesi için simülasyonlar 
gerçekleştirdik. 300 müşteri ile elde ettiğimiz sonuçlar tüm müşteriler bağlantı isteğini 
aynı anda gönderdiğinde ortalama kimlik doğrulama süresinin 1 saniyenin altında 
olduğunu göstermiştir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Mesh Network (WMN) is a multi-hop wireless networking technology to 
provide broadband ubiquitous access in metropolitan area. WMN provides flexible 
service like ad hoc networks, and supports this flexibility with the centralized structure 
of Wi-Fi. With the assistance of wireless mesh routers, WMNs are easily established. 
Moreover, WMN provide high connection speeds with less overhead.  
With the potential number of active users, it is inevitable that there will be more 
than one operator, who will charge the general use of the clients and provide connection 
in the metropolitan area. Current payment schemes mostly consider that the operators 
are fully trusted, and clients are potential cheaters.  However in real life, the operators 
may intentionally or unintentionally overcharge their users.  
1.1. Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we propose a prepaid payment scheme for WMNs. Our scheme 
aims to give the control to the clients. Moreover, we designed protocols for avoiding 
cheating among clients and the operators.  
In our proposed system, for providing an efficient prepaid payment scheme in 
ubiquitous networks, we are inspired in making micropayments which includes tokens 
in a connection card. The tokens are generated using cryptographic hash chains [3]. In 
this scheme an initial value (IV) is hashed n times and each of the computed elements 
serves as tokens. While getting service, these tokens are submitted to the operator 
beginning from the first,    	
 , to the last token,   	
. Hash functions 
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are one way and irreversible functions. Hence, when a token is submitted by the client, 
it is not possible to derive unused tokens from this submitted one without knowing IV.  
In our payment scheme, the only fully trusted entity is connection card issuer 
(CCI). It is responsible for generating connection cards for the clients. After generation 
of connection cards, CCI only distributes first token of each connection card to the 
operators. Moreover, operators get information of the used tokens from the clients while 
providing service. Hence, an operator cannot charge a client for unprovided service. 
For mutual authentication and authorization among clients and operators, we have 
designed several protocols. With the use of these protocols and the token mechanism 
described above, the clients cannot repudiate using a token for services obtained and 
spend a token twice.  
In our scheme it is possible to roam between the operators using the same 
connection card. All the used tokens are stored in the operators’ databases. Hence for 
the settlement phase an operator submits the used tokens of the foreign operator for 
getting paid.  
We have simulated our network using Omnet++ [11]. The performance metrics 
we use are end-to-end authentication latency and server service delay. For performance 
evaluation we consider two scenarios: one is a stress test, the other is typical real life 
scenario. In stress test 300 clients simultaneously send connection requests to server. 
Requests are handled in 669 ms for the home operator and 678 ms for foreign operator. 
This shows even in a rush scenario, our protocol handles connection requests in less 
than 1 second. For real life scenario, after sending connection requests, clients start TCP 
sessions. In this scenario for 40 clients, average end-to-end authentication latency is 532 
ms for home operator. Standard deviation of this latency is 409 ms. The reason of this 
high standard deviation value is, with network congestion, some of the connection 
request packets are dropped. Therefore, connection request packets are resend. This 
shows us even congestion occurs in the network, our protocol has a considerable 
authentication mean. 
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1.2. Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give background 
on Wireless Mesh Networks. In Section 3, we explained background information on 
cryptographic schemes that our protocol is built upon. In Section 4, we give details of 
our proposed scheme. Section 5 gives the results of our simulation and performance 
analysis. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
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2. BACKGROUND ON WIRELESS MESH NETWORKS 
Since the last decade, wireless technologies has been evolved. In the beginning of 
new millennium with expanding technology of GSM, first Wireless Application 
Protocol (WAP) is announced, and then respectively GPRS and 3G have followed this 
technology. Apart from GSM, while some existing networks like Wi-Fi and sensor 
networks are advancing, some new wireless technologies like WiMAX [20], and 
Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs) are arising. Nowadays, current wireless 
network technologies that are commonly used are Wi-Fi and ad hoc networks. These 
two network types have some significant drawbacks, if we consider providing 
connection service to a metropolitan area.  
Ad hoc networks are decentralized network structures that every node participates 
in routing protocols by forwarding received packets. Since it does not need a pre-
established wired backbone, it is easy to form a network with active nodes. Moreover 
since it does not comprise any stationary communication unit, an ad hoc network just 
covers a small area. Due to lack of a static structure, if a node drops out, some links 
between the nodes could easily be broken. This decentralized architecture is very 
suitable for some military applications, but for a metropolitan area, it is inadequate. 
On the other hand, Wi-Fi hotspots provide centralized structure, and it is adequate 
for connecting nodes in a city. The problem arises when we attempt to cover all the 
areas that the nodes are stationary. Since the access points (APs) cannot communicate 
with each other, we have to connect all APs with wires. Hence, this increases overhead 
of the networking establishment. Since the nodes cannot communicate with each other, 
this causes APs to use conventional star type communication as shown in Figure 2.1. In 
this topology all the nearby stations are connected to a single hub. Hence, network 
traffic sometimes encounters with bottlenecks. 
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Figure 2.1. Conventional Access Point Communication 
At this point, researchers focused on WMNs [1]. Basically WMNs have central 
infrastructure of Wi-Fi, and flexibility of ad hoc networks. As in the traditional Wi-Fi 
networks with the centralized structure, WMNs are basically based on gateways, access 
points (APs) and clients.  
The differences between WMN and conventional ad hoc and Wi-Fi networks are 
the following: 
• WMNs have been more flexible with the implementation of the modified 
versions of ad hoc routing protocols supporting communication between 
the entities in a wireless environment.  
• With the participation of the nodes and APs in routing protocols, network 
is more transparent to these entities.  
2.1. Components of WMN 
The components of WMNs are mesh routers and mesh clients [1][17]. Mesh 
routers are a combination of gateways and access points with additional features. These 
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routers have minimal mobility. Some mesh routers with gateway property can gain 
access to the backhaul network/Internet as shown in Figure 2.2. Apart from that, 
because mesh structure is not wired, it is easier to extend the network area with the 
same transmission power by establishing new mesh routers in an area. This is enabled 
because of the multi-hop structure.  
Mesh routers also can be used as bridge for establishing connectivity of different 
networks. As shown in Figure 2.2, Wi-Fi, cellular, WiMAX and sensor networks can be 
connected with the mesh infrastructure via mesh routers. On the other hand, wireless or 
wired stations can also connect to mesh routers directly.  
 
Figure 2.2. Mesh Backbone [1]  
Mesh clients are regular stations, except that they can join routing protocols, 
which makes mesh backbone transparent for the nodes. Moreover, they have simple 
hardware compared to the mesh routers. 
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2.2. Wireless Mesh Network Types 
There are three types of WMNs [1][8]: client-mesh network, infrastructure type 
mesh network, and hybrid mesh networks.  
Infrastructure Mesh Network: In this mesh network type, mesh routers with 
gateway capabilities provide connection between the network and the backbone. All the 
mesh routers are connected to each other in a wireless medium. Mesh routers with 
bridging capabilities are responsible for the integration of other kind of networks as 
cellular or ad hoc networks with the mesh infrastructure.   
This infrastructure type makes WMN suitable for many networking scenarios. 
One of the closest network type to end users is home networking. Current challenge of 
Wi-Fi networks in home networking is that APs are not being able to cover the dead 
zones in a house. At some points some devices will not have enough transmission 
power for connection. In such cases, the coverage should be extended by establishing 
new APs, which needs cable installation. In WMNs, by using mesh routers, all the users 
in a house can easily establish connection with each other. One of the routers could 
provide connection of all these devices to backhaul network.  
The other example is community and neighborhood networking. All the networks 
that are established in the home networking could be connected with each other with the 
assistance of mesh routers. These mesh routers are placed on the roofs of the houses. In 
Figure 2.3, differences of the coverage zones between Wi-Fi and WMN in a 
neighborhood are depicted. 
 
Figure 2.3. Coverage Area of Wi-Fi and WMN [8] 
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Client Mesh Network: Client mesh networks are established similar to 
conventional ad hoc networks with peer-to-peer connections of the nodes. In this type of 
connections, there is no need for a mesh router, but all the devices must have the same 
type of radio.  
Hybrid Type Networks: This is the combination of infrastructure and client mesh 
networks. This combination is important especially in the home networking, because 
dead zones can easily be covered by using ordinary wireless devices. Clients can 
communicate with each other, while mesh routers are providing connectivity of the 
clients with the Internet backbone. Hence, it decreases the traffic burden of APs in 
conventional Wi-Fi. 
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3. BACKGROUND ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC PRIMITIVES 
In this section, we give cryptographic protocols that we used in our payment 
scheme. In Section 3.1, we mention about hash functions. In Section 3.2 we give details 
of hash chains, which is the protocol that our scheme is based on. In Section 3.3 we give 
message authentication code background, and mention about HMAC. In Section 3.4 we 
give brief information about symmetric encryption. In Section 3.5 we mention about 
public key cryptography. 
3.1. Hash Functions 
Hash function [6][7] h is a one way and irreversible function that takes large 
variable size input and returns fixed and usually smaller size output. Because of their 
main features, they have taken very critical roles in security area. Main properties can 
be denoted as: 
1. Input texts can be variable size, but h has a fixed size output. 
2. h is an easily computable function. 
3. h is a one-way and irreversible function, which makes computation of x 
infeasible from a given 
    . This property is called weak collision 
resistance. 
4. It is computationally infeasible to find colliding 
  
 such that x ≠ y. 
This property is called strong collision resistance.  
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3.2. Hash Chains 
Hash chains [3] are established as applying a hash function on another hash value, 
which is shown as  … 

, where x is a variable size input.  
Hash chain with 3 elements is denoted as: 

  

 (3.1) 
More generally, hash chain with n elements is denoted as: 
 … 
 … 
   
 (3.2) 
 n 
In a hash chain based security protocol, derived hash values are used backwards 
as 
, 
, 
, …,  
. For instance an input value x is hashed 100 
times, 

 , and this hash value is sent to a receiver. Then, x is hashed 99 
times, 

, and hash output is sent. This procedure proceeds until x is hashed only 
once, 

. As we mention in previous section, hash functions are one way and 
irreversible functions. Hence, whenever an adversary eavesdrop a single hash value 
from the hash chain, it is not possible to derive following hash values; it can only derive 
the previous ones, which are already used and staled. 
As another advantage of hash chains is that when two hash values are sent 
consecutively, second hash value can be validated by hashing it and comparing with the 
previous one. For instance, first 
, and then  
 is sent by a sender. When 
receiver gets these two values, he hashes the second one as 
. After that he 
compares whether it is identical with the previously sent hash value, 
. If they are 
equal, then 
  is validated. This validation feature of hash chains makes it 
unnecessary to store all the hash values in the receiver’s storage area. For the receiver, 
storing only the last received hash value is adequate. 
Hash functions are easily computational functions. This makes hash chains 
suitable for the security protocols. Hash chains are mostly used in creation of one-time 
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keys from a single password, because of its irreversible output property. In each 
connection session, instead of using a new key, session keys are derived using hash 
chains over a previously decided password with the server. Each time a new session is 
started, a newly derived hash value is used as session key. Hence, even a hash value is 
received by an adversary; it is not possible for him to use this value in another session.  
When all the hash values in a hash chain are used, a new initial value must be 
chosen. 
3.3. HMAC 
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) [6][7] are used for authentication of the 
messages, and generally used between two entities. This authentication is provided by 
the MAC functions. A message is given as the input of a MAC function, and an output 
message authentication code is produced from this message. MACs are formed by using 
a secret key. 
Sender sends the message m, with its authentication code, which is generated by 
MAC function with the secret key K. Hence, the authentication code is: 
. For 
validation of a received message m, receiver gives the message as the input of the MAC 
function, and uses the same secret key, K. If the output of this functions is same with 

, then the message is authenticated.  
 HMACs [18] use hash functions for generating MACs. HMAC is generated as: 

    !"#$
 %  &"#$
 % 

    (3.3) 
HMAC formula is described as follows: 
1. Secret key K, is appended with zeroes to the left for the creation of b-bit 
. b denotes number of bits in a block. 
2. ipad is a b bit value,  and formed by repeating (36)16 b/8 times.  is 
XORed with ipad. The result is '(. 
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3. m is concatenated with '(. Afterwards, it is hashed. Hi is formed. 
4. opad is a b bit value, and formed by repeating (5C)16 b/8 times.  is 
XORed with opad. The result is '. 
5. ' is concatenated with Hi. Afterwards, it is hashed. 
As we have mentioned in Section 3.1, hash is a one-way function. Hence, when it 
is used by a secret key, it is not possible for an attacker to alter a message and generate 
a new fake HMAC without knowing the key. 
 3.4. Symmetric Cryptography 
Symmetric cryptography is the cryptographic method that encryption and 
decryption is handled by the same secret key. This key is shared between two parties.  
There exist two types of symmetric cryptography: stream cipher, and block 
cipher. Stream ciphers [21] encrypt a text one byte at a time. RC4 is the most popular 
stream cipher, which is used in SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and WEP (Wired Equivalent 
Privacy). 
Block ciphers handle an input text as fixed size blocks, and produces equal length 
output ciphertext blocks. Most popular block cipher algorithm is Data Encryption 
Standard (DES) [23]. Other common block cipher algorithms are Advanced Enryption 
Standard AES [24], Blowfish [22], and Triple DES [23]. 
 3.5. Public Key Cryptography 
Main inspiration of public key cryptography (PKC) [5] lies behind using a pair of 
keys. One is publicly known public key. The other is secretly kept by the owner, which 
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is known as private key. In PKC, it is computationally infeasible to retrieve private key 
from public key. Some PKC protocols are Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [25], 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [25], Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [26], and 
RSA [4]. 
PKC is used for four main operations. These are encryption, decryption, signature 
and verification. Encryption is for providing data integrity and confidentiality of a 
message. Hence, a message is encrypted with the public key of the receiver. Decryption 
of this message is handled by the private key of the receiver. For protecting the 
authenticity of a message, message is encrypted with the private key of the sender, and a 
signature is produced. Because the private key is secretly kept by the owner, this is 
known as signature operation. Verification is handled by the public key of the sender.  
Encryption and decryption operations are shown in Figure 3.1. In this figure each 
user has a public-private key pair, which the public keys are shared with the other users, 
and private keys are kept secret by the owners.  
 
Figure 3.1. Encryption with Public Key Cryptography [7] 
In Figure 3.1 Bob owns public keys’ of Joy, Mike, Alice and Ted. He has 
encrypted the plaintext with Alice’s public key, and a ciphertext is generated. This 
ciphertext can only be decrypted by Alice’s private key.  
 14 
 
Digital signature methods [25] are based on public key cryptography. In Figure 
3.2 before signing operation, Bob generates its public-private key pair, and distributes 
its public key to the other system users. He seals the input text with his private key. This 
text can be authenticated by all the users who wields the public key of Bob (in Figure 
3.2, Alice possesses it). Hence, as long as Bob keeps secret its private key, it is 
computationally infeasible to get this key for an adversary, and substitute Bob. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Authentication [7] 
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4. PROPOSED SECURE PREPAID PAYMENT SCHEME 
In this section, we give design details of our proposed scheme. Before giving the 
details of the system, we mention about the requirements of a secure payment system 
for Metropolitan Area Networks. At the end of this section, we give which requirements 
are met.   
4.1. Requirements of a Payment System 
For Metropolitan Area Networks, requirements of a secure payment scheme are as 
follows: 
• Wide Coverage: getting service without any restrictions in a larger zone is 
important for the users. With wireless routers, WMN has a suitable and 
flexible infrastructure for supporting wide area coverage.  
• Roaming: users must be able to connect in all operators’ zone by using the 
same connection method. 
• Seamless connection: while a client is moving from one access point to 
another, mobile usage of the network must be possible within the same 
operator’s zone.  
• Seamless roaming: connectivity is important for a client. Connection must 
not be interrupted (in payment terms) when a user switches from one 
operator to another. Moreover, while a client is roaming in a network, 
considerable delay causes problems.  
• Anonymity: in order to provide basic privacy, service has to be provided 
without need of having user’s unique identity. It could be possible to use 
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pseudonyms for getting service. The challenge here is that when it is 
needed by law enforcement, it must be possible to reveal the identities of 
the malicious and untrustworthy users 
• Mutual Authentication: for preventing malicious use of network, both user 
and network should be mutually authenticated. Moreover, man-in-the-
middle and replay attacks must be prevented as well. 
• No ultimate trust to service-providing operators: mostly users are 
considered as potential cheaters by the operators, but even the operators 
can cheat their clients. Moreover, home and foreign operators can cheat 
each other in roaming settlements. For instance, a user of operator A uses 
the network of operator B, but in the settlement phase operator B requests 
more funds than it has served. 
• Three way honesty: clients cannot deny that they did not take service. 
Home and foreign operators cannot claim that they provide service more 
than they actually provided. 
• Preventing Double Spending: it must not be possible to use a payment 
entity twice. In this respect, a user can use its monetary entity twice, or 
two clients can try to use the same payment entity at the same time. Both 
situations must be prevented. 
• Unlinkability: it must not be possible to relate connection sessions of the 
users with other connection sessions. Hence, higher level of privacy could 
be provided. 
4.2. General Overview of the Proposed Scheme 
In our proposed system for providing access to the network, every operator that 
are also known as service providers, must get public-private key pair at the beginning. 
Instead of direct communication with operators by giving identities, clients get 
connection cards with unique Serial Number (SN), and an Initial Value (IV), that are 
sealed with the operator’s private key. These two situations lead us to employ a trusted 
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third party as a connection card issuer (CCI). Hence, each connection card is signed by 
the CCI. In Section 4.4 we will see details of this connection card structure and how the 
operators’ public-private key pairs are distributed. 
By hashing IV in connection card n times using hash chains	

; we generate 
n tokens1 . For starting a new connection, client concatenates SN with  	
, and 
encrypts it with the public key of the card owner operator. This starts the authentication 
phase, which we will mention in Section 4.5. Moreover, clients are not obliged to use 
whole connection card in one session. It can be consumed in several sessions. 
After client is validated by the operator, this operator sends  	
 to the access 
point (AP) that the client already sent request. A challenge-response protocol using 
HMAC starts in this phase. In the third part of the Section 4.6, we will give the details of 
this protocol. 
When client and the AP have authenticated each other, while getting service, 
clients must submit small tokens that are generated from the IV in the connection card to 
the operator. In Section 4.7, we will give the details of the ongoing connection and the 
disconnection phase. 
In real-life scenarios, there exists more than one operator; hence, roaming details 
should be mentioned as well. Getting service from a foreign operator, i.e. roaming, will 
be explained in Section 4.8. 
For unexpected interruptions in sessions, servers must be informed periodically. 
Hence, update packets must be sent to server. Moreover, clients’ disconnection process 
must be properly handled. Packet update and disconnection phase details will be given 
in Section 4.9. 
In Section 4.10 we will give the details of how the seamless connection is 
provided when a client moves from one AP to another in the home operator’s area. 
                                                
1 In the following sections we have used the word token, and hash value synonymously. 
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• In SSIDs of the APs service cost and operator identity could be given. 
Clients choose manually which AP they will connect.  
Mobile station in Figure 4.1.a refers to clients that are mentioned as connection 
card holders. Clients send connection requests to the service providers. For the client 
side, it is important how the serving operator is chosen. An AP can be selected with 
respect to one or a combination of these criteria: 
1. AP with the lowest service cost 
2. AP with the best transmission power 
3. AP from the home operator 
4. AP with best quality of service 
For our simulations, AP with best transmission power is selected by the clients.  
The last entity, operator server shown in Figure 4.1.d, has two main functions as 
follows:  
• Storing required connection card information  
• Responding to all the connection requests 
 Table 4.1 gives the symbols that will be used in our proposed payment scheme.  
Table 4.1. Symbols used in payment scheme 
. 
 Hash function that generates 512 bit hash value 
. 
 Hash chain function, means hash n times 
||, A concatenates with B 
-. Public Key 
-/ Private Key 
012
 Encryption of x with Public Key 
314
 Decryption of x with Private Key 
014
 Signing x with Private Key 
312
 Validate x with Public Key 

 Hash x with the key of K 
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4.4. Connection Card Issuer 
In this section, we give details of how the connection cards are issued and stored 
by the clients. Moreover, we mention about the token creation and distribution of the 
connection card information to the operators.  
4.4.1. Connection Cards 
For getting service from an operator, every client should get a connection card 
which is issued by connection card issuer (CCI), and each card is issued for a certain 
operator. Connection cards include tokens. While clients are getting service from the 
operator, they make the payment by periodically submitting tokens to the operator. Each 
connection card has a 128 bit unique Serial Number (SN), an Operator ID that shows 
identity of the token holder’s service provider, 128 bit Initial Value (IV), that will be 
used as a seed for creating tokens, and a Hash Count that shows how many tokens that 
the current card contains (on the other hand how many times that the IV will be hashed 
for issuing first token). For legal reasons to get a connection card, clients must give their 
identities to the trusted CCI. CCIs are trusted third parties such that they do not divulge 
the identities to any service provider; they only give the data to law enforcement units 
when requested. 
Operator’s 1024 bit public key (PKOID) is also attached to the connection cards. 
The data that a connection card (CC) has are shown as follows: 
   '5 % 6"78#9!8 363
 %  :&9&#; 	#;<7	
  % #= !<:9 % ->?@  
   (4.1) 
 CC is signed by the private key of CCI, which gives us a 1024 bit signature of 
the CCI. Signature algorithm, signature, and expiration date of the connection card is 
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also attached to the connection card. All the information a connection card contains is 
listed in Table 4.2. 
We assume that all clients obtain the public key of the CCI. Each time a client 
purchases a connection card, it retrieves the CC information from this card, and 
authenticates if it is from the trusted CCI, by verifying the signature over the card.  
Table 4.2. Connection Card Details 
Serial Number (SN) 128 bit number. Unique for each connection card 
Operator ID (OID) Operator Id of the card owner  
Initial Value (IV) 128 bit Initial Value that will be hashed to create tokens 
Hash Count (HC) Token count that will be generated from the IV 
Signature Algorithm signature algorithm information that is used to create signature (i.e. 
PKCS #1 SHA-1 With RSA Encryption) 
Expiration Date Date when the card will lose its validity 
PKOID 1024 bit public key of the Operator 
Signature 1024 bit signature of the CCI over all fields. 
4.4.2. Creation of Tokens  
Our payment scheme is built upon micro payments, which denoted as Tokens in a 
connection card in our solution. Tokens are created by hashing IV n times which forms 
a hash chain as 	
. While getting service, clients must submit these tokens to the 
operator. After a certain usage of the network, in order to continue to get service, clients 
send following token, 	
  	

, which is created by hashing IV n-1 
times. After all the tokens are consumed, users must get a new connection card. 
Connection card information is stored in the client’s database. Each time a new token is 
generated, n value which shows the remaining token count is stored as Remaining 
Token Count (RTC) in the client database. The Last Hash Value (LHV) that has been 
derived by hashing IV RTC times is also stored in the database. RTC is equal to Hash 
Count when a new unused connection card is purchased. 
Token information stored in the client database is given below. 
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'9!87$ A!B7: :C!  '5 % 63 % 	 % #= !<:9 % /A % D	               (4.2) 
4.4.3. Distribution of the Connection Card Information to the Operators 
  All the connection card information is signed and distributed by CCI to the 
relevant service providers with respect to the Operator IDs of the cards. In order to 
prevent operators from creating tokens in a connection card, instead of IV, only Last 
Hash Value (LHV) of the tokens, which is provided by hashing IV Hash Count (HC) 
times, is provided to these operators. Hence, this prevents operators from cheating other 
operators or the clients.  
 For storing connection card information, operators need a database. Track of a 
connection card in the operator database is as follows:  
'9!87$ A!B7: :C!  '5 %  % /A % D	 % :.=7 % A&7!<9   (4.3) 
 As mentioned before, for an unused connection card Remaining Token Count 
(RTC) is equal to HC, and LHV is received from the CCI. During a session at which a 
client actively uses network, each time this client sends Hash values (tokens) to the 
operator for payment purposes, operator hashes each received hash value one time, and 
checks if it is equal to the stored LHV. At the end of session if it is validated, RHC is 
decremented by 1. When this value reaches to 0, the connection card becomes invalid. 
Details of this will be given in Section 4.5. 
 To prevent double use of the hash chains, In Use field is set as true, while a 
client is getting service. By this way if the users are trying to use same connection card, 
only one of them will get service. In case of connection interrupts, or some other 
disconnection reasons, timeout field is used, to set the token as not in use in a 
predefined time period. 
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4.5. Authentication 
In this section we will give authentication details of our proposed scheme. In the 
beginning we assume that every client has at least one valid connection card, which is 
previously explained in Section 4.4.1. The necessary information we have retrieved 
from this card is shown as: 
  '5 % 6"78#9!8 3 63
  % :&9&#; 	#;<7	
 % #=!<:9 % ->?@  (4.4) 
As we have mentioned in Section 4.3, depending on its hardware each AP 
broadcasts beacons that includes its Operator ID and Service Cost, or shares this 
information in its SSID. Whenever a client receives this information, it stores them in 
its memory as:  
-:C!  '9#9<= % - %  '78E&F7!=9 %  6"78#9!8 3  (4.5) 
Service cost is the length of the packets that a client can transfer before sending a 
new token. For example if it is 4096, client should send a new token after the transfer of 
4MB packets. Status is status of the AP that indicates current authentication situation as: 
Not authenticated, authenticated, or associated. 
We discuss Authentication in three subsections: 
1- Initial authorization of the client by service provider 
2- Mutual authentication of AP and client (Challenge-Response protocol) 
3- Authorization of a client in foreign domain 
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4.5.1. Initial Authorization 
 
Figure 4.2. Initial Authorization 
In Figure 4.2, connection medium between client and AP and between the APs is 
wireless. Other than that all the lines are wired. Wireless communication is shown with 
dotted lines, and wired communication is shown with straight lines. As we have 
mentioned in Section 4.3, client chooses the AP with best transmission power. Chosen 
AP is denoted as APS (Serving Access Point) in Figure 4.2. Moreover, APR (Relaying 
Access Point) is the AP that is connected to the Internet backbone via gateway. In this 
figure, these two APs are a part of mesh network topology. This topology includes 
different number of APs and it is shown as a cloud. In this cloud, APS forwards the 
packets to APR through the other included APs in a multi-hop manner. This 
communication is shown by denser dotted lines. 
Assume hash count of the first connection card that the client holds is 100, all the 
wired lines and the communication within the mesh network are encrypted, and 
connection card was never used before. Authentication steps are described below.  
1. Client forms a connection request (CR) as follows: 
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(a) Client hashes the Initial Value (IV) Hash Count times:  
   	
 (4.6) 
(b) Client concatenates Serial Number (SN) with  
(c) Client encrypts this value with the public key of the operator (PU-Op) 
which is included in the connection card. 
 /  012>G'5||
 (4.7) 
(d) Client sends CR to APS 
2. APS creates an entry for the client in the database:  
;&7:9 0:98  - % '9#9<= % #=	#;<7 % 37F877:9 !<:9 %
-#FB790F77$ % A!B7: : .=7 % A&7!<9 (4.8) 
IP refers to the IP address of the client. For the initialization phase, Status is 
set as not authenticated. HashValue is null at this point, and we will receive it 
from home operator in the reply packet. Decrement Amount and Packet Exceed 
will be explained in Section 4.6 (Packet Transfer). Token in Use field is for 
preventing double use, and DoS attack. It is set as true until the end of Timeout 
period or a disconnection request is received. APS routes CR to its gateway, 
through relaying access points (APR) in the mesh network. 
3. Gateway creates client info in its database: 
;&7:9 0:98  - % #= 	#;<7 % '9#9<= % D#=9 - - % A!B7: &: .=7  
 (4.9) 
All the information is same with the APS, except the Last AP IP field. 
This is for routing reply packet from operator to the serving AP. Moreover, it is 
used for a seamless connection while a client is moving to another APs coverage 
area. After storing the necessary information, gateway relays packet to the 
operator. 
4. After the reception of CR, operator: 
(a) Decrypts CR with its private key (PR-OP): 
 314>G/
  '5 % ; (4.10) 
(b) Checks whether the card info exists in the database; 
(c) If it is not in use, compares received Hash Value with the stored one: 
  D	. If it is valid, then the client is authenticated. 
5. In order to form Reply Packet (RP) the operator: 
(a) Signs  % ;&7:9 - % H#97I#- with its private key as follows: 
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/-   014>G % ;&7:9 - % H#97I#-
 (4.11) 
(b) Sends RP to the gateway with GatewayIP. 
6. Gateway with the GatewayIP: 
(a) Validates the signature of the operator; 
(b)  Updates Hash Value of the Client Entry with Client IP with H0, and sets 
Status as Authenticated; 
(c) Relays RP to the APS mentioned in the Client Entry in the database. In 
the mesh topology, packet is first received by APR. After reception of the 
packet, it is routed to  APS through the other APs in the mesh network. 
7. APS performs the same operations with gateway. Hence, APS: 
(a) Validates the signature of the operator; 
(b)  Updates Hash Value of the Client Entry with Client IP with H0, and sets 
Status as authenticated; 
(c) Sends challenge request to client. (This will be explained in Section 
4.5.3) 
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4.5.2. Reuse of a Connection Card 
 
Figure 4.3. Reuse of a Connection Card 
Reuse of the connection cards does not differ much from initializing a connection 
with a new connection card mentioned in previous section. Only difference is instead of 
sending first token H0, one of the other tokens is sent as shown in Figure 4.3. Except 
that the other challenge is, Stored Hash Value in the operator’s database must be 
properly updated. 
Reuse of a connection card is described below. 
1. Client forms a connection request (CR) as follows: 
(a) Client hashes the IV Hash Count times:  
   JK	
 (4.12) 
(b) Client concatenates SN with  
(c) Client encrypts this value with PU-Op, which is included in the 
connection card. 
 /  012>G'5 % 
 (4.13) 
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(d) Client sends CR to APS 
2. APS creates an entry for the client in the database. APS routes CR to its gateway, 
through relaying access points (APR) in the mesh topology. 
3. Gateway creates client info in its database. Gateway relays CR to the operator. 
4. After the reception of CR, operator: 
(d) Decrypts CR with its private key (PR-OP): 
 314>G/
  '5 % ; (4.14) 
(e) Checks whether the card info exists in the database; 
(f) If it is not in use, compares received Hash Value with the stored one: 
  D	. If it is valid, then the client is authenticated. 
5. In order to form Reply Packet (RP) the operator: 
(a) Signs  % ;&7:9 - % H#97I#- with its private key as follows: 
/-   014>G % ;&7:9 - % H#97I#-
 (4.15) 
(b) Sends RP to the gateway with GatewayIP. 
6. Gateway with the GatewayIP: 
(a) Validates the signature of the operator; 
(b)  Updates Hash Value of the Client Entry with Client IP with H24, and 
sets Status as authenticated; 
(c) Relays RP to the relevant AP mentioned in the Client Entry in the 
database. In the mesh topology, packet is first received by AP that is 
directly connected to the gateway. After reception of the packet, it is 
routed to  APS through the other APs in the mesh network. 
7. APS performs the same operations with gateway. Hence, APS: 
(a) Validates the signature of the operator; 
(b)  Updates Hash Value of the Client Entry with Client IP with H24, and 
sets Status as authenticated; 
(c) Sends challenge request to client.  
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4.5.3. Access Point Authentication  
 
Figure 4.4. Access Point Authentication Using a Challenge-Response Protocol 
After validation of Reply Packet received from operator, APS starts a challenge-
response protocol for mutual authentication between client and APS. 
As shown in Figure 4.4, APS authentication is described below. 
1. APS sends a challenge request to the client which started connection. 
2. When client receives this challenge request, it sends a 128 bit challenge to the 
APS 
(a) Client drops the packet if it is not the AP that he sent connection request. 
(b) Client drops the packet if there was not any authentication request. 
3. APS hashes this challenge, and uses relevant Hash Value (here ) which is 
stored as Last Hash Value (LHV) as the key of HMAC: 
/  LMN#;;7:O7
 (4.16) 
APS sends response R to the client. 
4. Client also hashes the challenge and uses the stored Hash Value () as the key 
of HMAC. Then compares MN#;;7:O7
  LMN#;;7:O7
. 
If it is authenticated client sets the APS as authenticated. 
5. Instead of adding a new step to the challenge-response protocol, as soon as APS 
gets the next token from the client, it sets the Status of the client as associated.  
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4.6. Packet Transfer 
 
Figure 4.5. Packet Transfer 
 After Mutual authentication of client and APS, client starts to send packets as 
shown in Figure 4.5. 
1. Before sending data packet, client sends next token (H1) first. (It causes client to 
spend one token for each connection session.) 
2. APS gets H0 from the Client Entry in the database. Then: 
(a) Checks if 
     
(b) If true sends acknowledgement (Ack) to Client, and sets Client as 
associated 
3. Client sends first 1024 byte data packet p0 . 
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4. APS decrease Decrement Amount (DA) with the length of the packet (here 1024 
byte). When client is first authenticated DA was set as the Service Cost of the 
APS.  
5. DA value is also stored in client’s database. Therefore, client proceeds sending 
data packets until DA value drops to 0.  
6. Client sends next hash value (H2). 
(a) If DA goes below 0, with every received packet APS increments Packet 
Exceed field by packet length. Hence, client could proceed sending 
packets for a while. 
(b) When H2 is received and validated, DA is set to Service Cost of the APS 
and Packet Exceed value is decremented from DA. Then Packet Exceed 
set to 0. 
(c) If Packet Exceed value exceeds a predefined limit. Client is set as Not 
Authenticated, and all the packets received from this client will be 
ignored. 
7. Every time DA goes below 0, client sends next token.  
4.7. Roaming 
If the operator of the connection card is different from the home operator, then 
client will roam between these two service providers. According to Figure 4.6 steps are 
as follows: 
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Figure 4.6. Roaming 
1. Client forms a connection request as mentioned in Section 4.3.1, Step 1. 
(a) SN % H0 is encrypted with the public key of foreign operator (PU-FOp): 
 /  012P>G'5 % 
 (4.17) 
(b) APS creates Client Entry in its database as in authentication, Step 2. 
(c) APS routes CR to APR within the mesh network. 
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(d) APR relays CR to gateway.  
(e) Gateway creates Client Entry in its database as in authentication, Step 3. 
(f) Gateway relays CR to home operator. 
2. Home operator creates a roaming token entry (RTE).  
(a) RTE = ClientIP % HashValue % SN % TotalHashCount % inUse.  (4.18) 
Sets Hash Value as “waiting” and inUse field as false.  
(b) Home operator relays CR to foreign operator. 
3. After the reception of CR, foreign operator: 
(a) Decrypts CR with its Private Key (PR-FOp):  
314P>G/
  '5 % ; (4.19) 
(b) Checks whether the card info exists in the database; 
(c) If it is not in use, compares received hash value with the stored one: 
  D	. If it is valid, then the client is authenticated. 
4. Foreign operator forms roaming reply packet (RR) and signs this packet with its 
private key: 
(a) //   014P>G % '5 % ;&7:9 -
 (4.20) 
(b) Then it relays this packet to the home operator. 
5. When home operator receives RR 
(a) It verifies the signature with the public key of foreign operator: 
DPU-FOp(RR). (4.21) 
(b) Stores H0 and RR in its database. 
6. Home operator forms a new reply packet: 
(a) Finds the GatewayIP information from the database with respect to the 
ClientIP 
(b) Signs  % ;&7:9 - % H#97I#- with its private key:                     
/-   014>G % ;&7:9 - % H#97I#-
 (4.22) 
(c) Relays RP to the gateway with GatewayIP 
7. Gateway with the GatewayIP: 
(a) Validates the signature of the operator; 
(b)  Updates hash value of the Client Entry with Client IP with H0, and sets 
Status as Authenticated; 
(c) Relays RP to the relevant AP mentioned in the Client Entry in the 
database. In the mesh topology, packet is first received by AP that is 
 34 
 
directly connected to the gateway, APR. After reception of the packet, it 
is routed to  APS through the other APs in the mesh network. 
8. APS performs the same operations with gateway. Hence APS: 
(a) Validates the signature of the operator; 
(b)  Updates hash value of the Client Entry with Client IP with H0, and sets 
Status as authenticated; 
(c) Sends challenge request to client for the challenge-response protocol 
explained in Section 4.5.3. 
4.8. Update Packets and Disconnection 
For connection interruptions, APs and gateways send periodically update packets. 
Moreover, for reusing connection cards, clients must disconnect properly from the 
system. In this section we give details of update packets, as disconnection phase. 
4.8.1. Update Packets 
As we have mentioned in Section 4.6, after the authentication phase, validation of 
the micropayments are handled by the APs, for decreasing the burden on the operator 
server. Even in this situation servers must be informed periodically to prevent any 
problem when there is an interruption in the connection. 
 Sending update packets is performed in two steps: 
1. APs send update packets to gateways 
2. Gateways send update packets to operator servers 
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For supporting a seamless mobile communication in home operator, if the mobile 
client, which is moving from one APs zone to another, is validated in gateway layer, 
this could lower the authentication delay in considerable amounts. The reason is server 
is not interrupted, and public key encryption steps are bypassed. The motivation for 
sending update messages to gateway first, instead of sending immediately to server, lies 
behind this.  
 
 
Figure 4.7. Update Packets 
In Figure 4.7 all the wired lines are encrypted. With respect to this figure, update 
packets are evaluated as follows: 
1. When client sends first token after the connection is initialized, AP starts a time-
out period of t1 seconds for sending update messages to gateway.  
2. APS routes last received and validated token (here H4) to APR within the mesh 
network. With the reception of H4, APR relays it to gateway. 
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3. Gateway hashes the received token, until it is equal to the stored Hash Value. If 
it is validated then hash value in the database is updated. 
4. After t2 seconds passed till the last Update Packet received from APS, gateway 
sends last received and validated token (here H7) to home operator. 
5. Operator hashes the received token. Afterwards check if it is equal to the stored 
Hash Value. If it is validated then hash value in the database is updated and 
Remaining Token Count value is decreased by 1. 
4.8.2. Disconnection 
 
Figure 4.8. Disconnection (Home Operator) 
For reusability of the connection cards, it is important for a client to properly 
disconnect from the system. There are two different disconnection cases: disconnection 
from home operator, and disconnection while roaming.  
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Disconnection from home operator is shown in Figure 4.8. Disconnection occurs 
as follows: 
1. After client sends last used token to the APS, sends a disconnection request 
(DR). 
2. APS updates the Client Entry Status as not authenticated, and routes Last Token 
(here H17) with ClientIP, and DR to APR within the mesh network. 
3. Gateway validates H17 and updates the Client Entry Status as not authenticated. 
Afterwards gateway relays last token (here H17) with ClientIP, and DR to 
gateway. 
4. Operator hashes H17, and checks whether if it is identical with stored Hash 
Value. If it is validated, then Remaining Hash Value is decremented by 1 and 
Hash Value is updated with H17. 
5. Operator sets In Use field of the Client Entry as false. Afterwards operator 
relays disconnection acknowledgement (DA) with the Client IP to gateway. 
6. As soon as gateway receives DA, it deletes the related Client Entry. Then 
gateway routes DA to the AP that is directly connected to the gateway, APR. 
After reception of the packet, it is routed to APS through the other APs in the 
mesh network. 
7. APS deletes Client Entry with the reception of DA, as well.  
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Figure 4.9. Disconnection (Roaming) 
For the roaming, disconnection phase is shown in Figure 4.9. Disconnection 
details are given below. 
1. After client sends last used token to the APS, she sends a DR. 
2. APS updates the Client Entry Status as not authenticated, and routes last token 
(here H17) with ClientIP, and DR to APR within the mesh network. 
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3. Gateway validates H17 and updates the Client Entry Status as not authenticated. 
Afterwards operator relays last token (here H17) with ClientIP, and DR to 
gateway. 
4. Home operator hashes H17, and checks whether if it is identical with stored Hash 
Value. If it is validated, then Remaining Hash Value is decremented by 1. For 
settlement among the operators, home operator stores SN and H17. 
5. Home operator signs Last Token, here H17. Afterwards, operator relays last 
token with Serial Number of the connection card, and DR to foreign operator. 
6. Foreign operator hashes token until it is identical with stored Hash Value. If it is 
validated, then Remaining Hash Value is decremented and Hash Value is 
updated. For this example, if the stored Hash Value is H0, H17 is hashed 17 
times. Afterwards, Remaining Hash Value is decremented by 17 and Hash Value 
is updated with H17. For the settlement phase, signed last token is stored. 
7. Foreign operator sets In Use field of the Client Entry as false. It forms Signed 
Token (ST) by signing SN || H17. Sends ST to home operator. 
8. Operator validates ST. If it is validated, it stores ST for the settlement phase. 
Operator sets In Use field of the Client Entry as false. Afterwards operator 
relays Disconnection Acknowledgement (DA) with the Client IP to gateway 
9. As soon as gateway receives DA, it deletes the related Client Entry. Then 
gateway routes DA to the AP that is directly connected to the gateway, APR. 
After reception of the packet, it is routed to APS through the other APs in the 
mesh network. 
10. APS deletes Client Entry with the reception of DA, as well.  
4.9. Seamless Mobility in Home Operator 
When a client moves out of the coverage area of associated AP, then a new 
connection initialization process should be started. If the client is still in the same 
operator’s zone, it is possible not to start the authentication phase from scratch.  
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In this setting, if a client moves from one AP’s zone to another, it just passes the 
previously recorded information to the new AP. Each AP has a key pair and registered 
to a specific gateway. Gateways are responsible from a local zone. Moreover, we 
assume that gateways are trusted third parties and they broadcast public keys of the 
registered APs to the other registered APs within their local zone. Here distribution of 
the key pairs is out of our scope of the thesis.  
 
 
Figure 4.10. Mobile Client 
In Figure 4.10 client moves to the new AP’s (APN) coverage area from old AP 
(APO).  In this figure last used token is taken as H16, and remaining length of data packet 
is shown as DA. Seamless mobility is provided as follows: 
1. Client sends identity information of the new AP (APN) to APO. 
2. APO concatenates H16, DA, timestamp TS, and encrypts it with the public 
key of APN. It relays this packet to APN via client.  
3. APN decrypts packet and checks whether it is expired.  
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4. If it is not expired, APN stores H16 and DA. Then APN sends a challenge 
request to the client. 
5. When client receives this challenge request, it sends a challenge to the APN 
6. APN hashes this challenge, and uses relevant Hash Value (here H16) as the 
key of HMAC: 
/  LMN#;;7:O7
 (4.23) 
APN sends response R to the client. 
7. Client also hashes the challenge and uses H16 as the key of HMAC. Then 
client compares it with the received R packet. If it is authenticated, client 
sets the APN as the new authenticated AP. 
4.10. Settlement among the Operators 
As we have mentioned in Section 4.7, clients are capable of roaming between two 
operators. From time to time the operators should run settlement procedure in order to 
transfer funds among themselves for the services provided to other operators’ 
customers. 
Important issue for settlement is that, all the used tokens must be stored in both 
Serving Operator’s (OS) and Token Owner Operator’s (OTO) database. For every 
established connection, OS stores token usage logs as follows: 
/!#&:O A!B7: D!O  '5 % 63 %  '&O:7$ Q&8=9 A!B7: % '&O:7$ D#=9 A!B7:  
 (4.24) 
For every roaming session, logs are stored in OTO’s database as follows: 
Token Log = SN || Serving Operator ID || Signed First Token || Signed Last Token  
 (4.25) 
Signed First Token is received in the authorization phase from the foreign 
operator. Moreover, Signed Last Token is received in the disconnection phase from the 
 42 
 
foreign operator as well. In the settlement among the operators, OS sends first and last 
used token information to the OTO. Current usage of the client is derived by hashing last 
used token until we get first used one. For instance, if first used token is H24 and last 
used token is H30. OTO hashes H30 6 times, and it has to make payment to OS for used 6 
tokens.  
If OS uses consecutive tokens of a connection card only one time, it does not 
cause any problems. The problem arises when different parts of a connection card are 
used by the same OS. 
For instance suppose a connection card CC0 includes 100 tokens. A client that 
wields CC0 has spent: 
• Token H0 to H15 in OS’s zone (First connection session); 
•  H16 to H22 in OTO’s zone (Second connection session);  
• H23 to H29 in OS’s zone again (Third connection session).  
It is very easy for OS to obtain all the tokens from H0 to H29 by hashing H29 29 
times. Hence, OS can cheat the OTO by saying that it has provided all the service for the 
client in exchange of the derived tokens. To prevent this, when OTO sends first token to 
OS, it signs and send it back to OTO. Moreover, when a roaming client sends a 
disconnection request, OS signs last used token received from the client. Afterwards, it 
sends this Signed Last Token to OTO.  
For this example, in first connection session, OTO receives first and last used 
tokens that are signed by OS, EPR-Os(H0), EPR-Os(H15). Moreover, in third connection 
session, OTO receives first and last used tokens that are signed by OS, EPR-Os(H23) and 
EPR-Os(H29). If OS claims that it has given all the service to the client with these received 
tokens, OTO can prove that OS only used tokens from H0 to H15, and tokens from H23 to 
H29. If OS does not send signed tokens it cannot be paid for the service it has given. 
For the abovementioned example, there exists another problem. After OTO had 
received H22, it can claim that it has given all the service for tokens from H0 to H22, 
instead H16 - H22. Therefore, for every connection and disconnection request OTO signs 
the tokens.  
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For this example, in first connection session, OS receives first and last used tokens 
that are signed by OTO, EPR-OTO(H0), EPR-OTO (H15). Moreover, in third connection 
session, OS receives first and last used tokens that are signed by OTO, EPR-OTO(H23) and 
EPR-OTO(H29). If OTO claims that it has given all the service for the tokens from H0 to H22, 
OS can deny it with the received tokens EPR-OTO(H0), EPR-OTO (H15).   
The only problem that the operators could encounter here rises if one of the 
operators does not send the first or last signed token. In initial authorization phase, if OS 
does not send first signed token, it would not be paid by OT for the provided service. 
Moreover, if OT cheats OS and does not send first signed token, OS does not give service 
to the client. For disconnection phase, if OS does not send the first signed token to OT, 
then OT does not give service as well. If signed last token is not received by OT, OS will 
not be paid for the service. On the other hand if OT does not send last signed token to 
OS, OS will not provide service to OT’s clients in exchange of the funds. Hence, cheating 
among the operators is prevented.  
4.11. Discussion 
In this section, we discuss which of the requirements given in Section 4.1 are met.  
Roaming/mobility: As we have seen in Section 4.5.2, reuse of a connection card is 
possible after attempting first connection. Roaming is supported, when our protocol is 
implemented in participating APs, and tokens are valid. 
Seamless connection: As shown in section 4.9, mobility of the users in home 
operator is supported.  Hence, clients in the same operator can move from one AP to 
another without any interruptions in their connections.  
Seamless roaming: Mobility of the clients from one operator’s zone to another is 
not provided without connection interruptions. This requirement is not met yet, but our 
infrastructure supports it.  
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Anonymity: As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, for legal purposes users must give 
their identities to connection card issuer (CCI) for getting connection cards. Therefore, 
as far as CCI keeps clients’ identities secret, users can stay anonymous.   
Mutual authentication: In Section 4.5.1 we have seen how the client is 
authenticated by the server. In Section 4.5.3, valid token information is received by the 
AP, and with the challenge-response protocol both AP and the Client is mutually 
authenticated.  
If there is an adversary between AP and the Client that intercepts the packet 
transfer between these two entities, in initialization phase, he can behave like the client. 
After the authentication phase, the adversary gets service from the Operator. Without 
getting service, client does not send the next token. Hence, client only loses two tokens 
in this situation; first is for establishing connection, second is for packet transfer.  
If the client is already authenticated, and while sending next token if the packet is 
captured by the adversary, because of the lack of the Serial Number knowledge, it is not 
usable by him. 
No ultimate trust to operators: In our scheme, users control their balance in the 
connection cards. Operators cannot generate tokens and it is not possible for the 
operators to retain unused tokens. Hence, they cannot cheat the users by saying “the 
token is already used”. 
Three-way honesty: Since the tokens are issued by CCI, only the CCI and 
connection card holder knows all the tokens that are related with a specific connection 
card. Hence whenever a Client sends a new token, it is not possible for him to say “I did 
not use it”. Since CCI is a trusted third party, in the roaming phase, operators cannot say 
that they provided service for non-used tokens.  
Preventing double spending: All the connection card information is stored in the 
database with In Use fields. Therefore it is not possible for two users to use the same 
connection card at the same time. Since the last token information is stored in the 
database, it is not possible to double-spend a token.  
Unlinkability: Our protocol does not provide unlinkability yet.  
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5. SIMULATION DETAILS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
In previous section, we have given the design details of our prepaid payment 
scheme. In this section, we will give how the protocol is simulated, simulation 
environment and network entities, delays of the cryptographic operations, network 
structure and performance evaluation. 
For performance evaluations we have implemented our protocol using Omnet++ 
[11], which is an object-oriented modular discrete event simulator. Omnet++ only 
provides infrastructure, hence it is supported by other open source frameworks such as 
INET Framework [12], Mixim [13], Oversim [14] etc. 
For the simulation of wireless networks, we have developed our protocol over 
INET framework. Mesh Network structure is still in experimental progress in this 
framework. Therefore, we have implemented our protocol over current IEEE 802.11g 
Wi-Fi standard.  
With the assistance of modular structure of Omnet++, we try not to modify 
anything in the link layer; hence we have implemented our payment module in the 
application layer. Therefore all the TCP and UDP packets are interpreted in our 
payment module before they are sent to/received from network layer. 
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5.1. Simulation Details 
In this section, we give the simulation details of our protocol.  
5.1.1. Environmental Details 
Clustered network structure supported in [9] is adapted to our simulations. This is 
shown in Figure 5.1. All the APs are connected to gateways with 4 Mbps point-to-point 
(PPP) lines.  Some important specifications about the APs are shown in Table 5.1. Here 
Service Cost shows the packet transfer rate for each token that the client sends. Update 
Interval is the time for sending next update packet to gateway  
Table 5.1. AP Specifications 
AP-Gateway Connection bit rate 4 Mbps - PPP 
AP Transmission bit rate 108 Mbps 
AP-Gateway Distance 10 m  (approximately) 
Service Cost 8 MB 
Update Interval 1 minute 
 
Gateways are for connecting APs to Internet backbone. Apart from the other 
gateways in the backbone, these store the client information for seamless connection. 
Gateways are connected each other via 1 Gbps PPP lines. For gateways, Update 
Interval is 2 minutes, and all the update packets are sent to home operator.  
Our network Topology consists of 13 gateways as shown in Figure 5.2, 32 APs as 
shown in Figure 5.3 and variable amount of mobile clients.  
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Figure 5.1. Clustered Structure 
 
Figure 5.2. Gateway backbone 
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Figure 5.3. Simulation Environment (APs and Servers) 
5.1.2. Public Key Operations and Their Timings 
Omnet++ does not support any cryptographic operations; therefore, we have 
integrated Crypto++ [15] to our simulations. However, it was not possible to get 
processing times of the encryption/decryption operations in a specific network device. 
Accordingly for gateways and APs, we have used public key cryptography processing 
timings from [10]. For operator servers, we have used timings from [16], which gives us 
performance metrics of a dual-core 64-bit Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz processors. For mobile 
clients, we have used performance values from [27] which uses Intel Celeron D 351 3.2 
GHz processor and encryption time is 31ms. 
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Platform specifications are shown in Table 5.2, and RSA timings are shown in 
Table 5.3.  
Table 5.2. Platform Specifications 
 Gateway [10] Linksys WRT54GS 
(AP) [10] 
Server [16] Client [27] 
CPU Speed 2.08 GHz 200 MHz Dual-core 64 
bit 2.8 GHz 
3.2 GHz 
CPU type  AMD Athlon XP 
2800 
Broadcom MIPS32 Intel Xeon Celeron D 
351 
RAM 512 MB 32 MB - - 
 
Table 5.3. 1024 bit RSA timings  
 Gateway [10] Linksys WRT54GS 
[10] 
Server [16] Client [17] 
RSA Encryption 0.4 ms 12.3 ms 0.4 ms 31 ms 
RSA Decryption 9.0 ms 300.6 ms 9.0 ms - 
5.1.3. Storage Requirements 
In initial authorization section (Section 4.5.1.), we give how the client entries are 
stored in APs databases. In Table 5.4 we give storage requirements of each client entry.  
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Table 5.4. Storage requirements for each client 
Client 
Entry 
IP Status Hash Value Decrement 
Amount 
Packet 
Exceed 
Token 
in Use 
Timeout 
Size (Bit) 32 2 512 32 32 1 16 
 
As shown in Table 5.4, 627 bit of information is stored in the AP memory per 
connected client. Hence 632 bit memory allocation is needed for each client. In addition 
to this, each AP allocates 1024 bit for operator’s public key. As given in burst scenario 
(Section 5.2.1), when there exists 600 clients in the simulation environment, maximum 
number of simultaneously connected client count in an AP is 28. This shows us for 28 
clients, 28*632 bits = 2198 bytes of memory space is required. Hence an AP with 32 
MB memory space is adequate for serving a considerable amount of clients and storing 
the other static values as public keys. 
5.1.4. Performance Metrics 
We use four performance metrics. 
1. End-to-end authentication latency is the average time elapsed between 
sending the connection request (by client) and completion of 
authentication.  
2. Server service time is the average duration for a server to complete the 
processing of a connection request packet. This metric also includes the 
waiting time of the message in the queue. 
3. Connected node count is the number of simultaneously connected nodes to 
network. 
4. Connected node count per AP gives the average and maximum number of 
nodes that are served by a single AP.  
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5.2. Simulation Scenarios and Results 
In this section, we give simulation results. In the first section, we give a burst 
scenario, where clients send connection requests simultaneously. In the second section, 
we simulate a real life scenario, where the clients intermittently connect to the system 
and start TCP sessions. In the third section, we combined these two given scenarios as a 
rush scenario. In this scenario, while users are sending TCP packets, at a certain time, 
200 clients send connection requests simultaneously. In the last section, we simulate a 
mobile real-life scenario with multiple operators. In this scenario, there exists three 
different operators and with every disconnection users move to a random point in the 
area.  
5.2.1. Burst Scenario 
Simulations in this section are for getting results how the infrastructure responds 
when all the connection requests are obtained at the same time. In this scenario all the 
uniformly distributed nodes send connection requests in first 5 seconds. 
We examined this scenario in two cases. In the first case, all the connection cards 
that the users wield are concerned with the home operator. In the second case, 
connection cards that the users wield are concerned with the foreign operator. We ran 
the same scenario for both cases.  
Figure 5.4 shows end-to-end latency for the first case together with standard 
deviation. End-to-end connection latency is the metric which is defined as the average 
time spent between sending the connection request by the client and end of the 
authentication process. For 600 nodes that are sending connection requests 
simultaneously, average latency is 1935 ms. As shown in Figure 5.4 with the linearly 
increasing number of connected clients, average latency and standard deviation is 
linearly increased, as well. Standard deviation of the average latency is high as 1660 ms. 
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The reason of this high standard deviation and linearly increasing connection latency is 
queue waiting time of the simultaneously sent connection request packets. However this 
is a stress test, and in real life this situation occurs rarely.  
 
 
Figure 5.4. End-to-End Connection Establish Time in Burst Scenario (Home Network) 
Mean server side service delay is shown in Figure 5.5. This metric is the average 
time spent between the arrivals of the connection request packet and processing of the 
packet. Hence, it includes the waiting time in the queue for processing. For 600 nodes it 
is approximately 15 ms. When we compared this with average end-to-end 
authentication latency, which is 1935 ms, we see that it is a tolerable delay. Although 
this delay is increasing linearly, as shown in Figure 5.5 increase rate of the delay is 
lower for the node count between 100 and 300, compared to node count between 300 
and 600. When we check end-to-end connection latency for 300 nodes, it is 678 ms. 
This value is below 1 second, and it is a reasonable amount. This shows us that 
optimum system performance is provided for 300 clients.  
When we simulate this scenario for foreign operator case, where all the clients 
wield connection cards of the foreign operator, results did not change much as shown in 
Figure 5.6. For 600 nodes average end-to-end authentication latency is 1945 ms. The 
reason of this is that as we have mentioned before, server side does not add a significant 
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amount of processing time as compared to the APs. Hence, most of the delay is caused 
by the slowest network entity, which  is AP. This shows us authentication latency can 
be decreased with network entities that have better processing units.  
 
 
Figure 5.5. Server Service Delay 
 
Figure 5.6. End-to-End Connection Establish Time in Rush Scenario (Foreign Network) 
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For calculation of the storage requirements of APs, in Figure 5.7 average and 
maximum connected client count per access point is shown. In our simulation for 600 
clients, maximum number of client that an AP serves is 28. As expected, both average 
and maximum number of connected nodes increase linearly as the number of nodes 
increases. 
 
 
Figure 5.7. Average Connected Client Count per Access Point 
5.2.2. Real-Life Scenario 
In this scenario, the clients establish periodic TCP sessions with random intervals 
and durations throughout simulation. Simulations are run for 60 simulation minutes. We 
ran the same scenario for both home and foreign networks. 
In each session, the amount of data that a user downloads is an exponentially 
distributed random variable with mean 20 MB. The first session of each client starts 
within the first 20 minutes, which is determined using uniform random distribution. The 
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interval between two consecutive sessions of a user is also determined uniformly 
random within the range from 35 seconds to 15 minutes. If there is not any network 
activity for 30 seconds for a client, then it is automatically disconnected. In this way, we 
simulate reconnections. Moreover, if a node is disconnected, and there is a session 
request, then clients send connection requests for reconnection purposes.  
As shown in Figure 5.8, if 40 nodes are running in the simulation, end-to-end 
connection latency is 532 ms in the home network, and standard deviation is 409 ms. In 
the situation, where an already sent connection packet is dropped, connection rerequest 
packets are sent. Connection latency includes these reconnection packets as well. This is 
the reason of high standard deviation.  
In the rush scenario mentioned in previous section, end-to-end connection latency 
is 429 ms for 200 nodes. This value is smaller than the latency value that we have 
acquired here. This shows us the network traffic in the simulation is important. Hence, 
this situation leads us to run a third scenario, where clients simultaneously attempt to 
make connection requests in a loaded network. This scenario will be given in Section 
5.2.3. 
In Figure 5.9, maximum and mean numbers of simultaneously connected nodes 
are given. Not all the nodes are connected at the same time. Hence, we give mean 
number of connected nodes, and maximum reached number of connected nodes. As we 
mentioned before, we ran the same simulation scenario for both home and foreign 
operator. Hence, mean and maximum number of simultaneously connected nodes is 
same for both scenarios. In most of the cases; maximum number of simultaneously 
connected nodes reaches 50% of the total node count. 
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Figure 5.8. End-to-End Delay in Real-Life Scenario (Home Network) 
 
Figure 5.9. Connected Node Count Details (Home Network) 
For foreign network, in Figure 5.10, when 40 nodes are running, average end-to-
end connection latency is 551 ms. This value was 532 ms for home networks. 
Additional operation cost in the foreign operator server, and packet delivery time 
between home and foreign operator cause this difference.  
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Figure 5.10. End-to-End Delay in Real-Life Scenario (Foreign Network) 
5.2.3. Rush Scenario 
In this scenario, we combine the two scenarios mentioned in the previous sections. 
As in real-life scenario, clients establish periodic TCP sessions with random intervals 
and durations throughout simulation. As in burst scenario, after 20 minutes, 200 nodes 
send connection requests simultaneously in 5 seconds. Hence, we measure how TCP 
packet transfers affect the connection latency in a stress test. 
In this scenario simulations are run on the home network. Moreover, parameters 
are the same as the parameters at the real-life scenario. Connection latency results 
shown in Figure 5.11 only include the authentication delay in rush period within 5 
seconds.  
In burst scenario, average connection delay caused by 200 nodes is 429 ms as 
given in Figure 5.4. With the participation of active 40 nodes, this is increased to 648 
ms. In Figure 5.11, real-life scenario results for the home operator, which was given in 
Figure 5.8, are given together with the rush scenario results. As shown in this figure, 
active clients change the connection latency with the same rate in both scenarios. In the 
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simulations, we only measured the latency in the rush period within the 5 second range. 
Hence, TCP traffic is the only reason of the connection latency differences between 
these two scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 5.11. End-to-End Delay in Rush Scenario 
5.2.4. Mobile Scenario 
In this scenario, clients establish TCP sessions as in real-life scenario. There are 
five main differences between these two scenarios. These differences are listed below.  
1. Each time a node disconnects from the system, it moves to a random point 
in the simulation area. 
2. Instead of one operator, there are three operators that are giving service to 
the clients.  
3. All the connection cards that are owned by different operators are 
distributed to the clients equally likely.  
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4. Each client connects to an AP with maximum transmission power 
irrespective of operator. That means roaming are possible. 
5. Each AP belongs to one of the three operators. Ownership of the APs is 
equally likely among the operators.  
We run a different simulation for this scenario. As in real-world scenario, we run 
four different simulations for 10, 20, 30 and 40 active clients. In Figure 5.12 average 
end-to-end connection latency and in Figure 5.13 average connected node count is given 
for mobile scenario. When we compare real-world (home network) and mobile 
scenarios, we see that  average and maximum connected node count performance is the 
same for both scenarios when number of active clients is 10 and 20. However for larger 
active numbers the performance of  mobile scenario is slightly worse. We also compare 
real-world scenario (home network) and mobile scenario for end-to-end latency metric. 
We see that the performance difference between these two scenarios is within +/- 10% 
range.  
 
 
Figure 5.12. End-to-End Delay in Mobile Scenario 
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Figure 5.13. Connected Node Count Details in Mobile Scenario 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this thesis, we proposed a secure prepaid payment scheme for Wireless Mesh 
Networks. Our scheme is a micropayment one, which is based on tokens. Tokens are all 
contained in the connection cards. Tokens are generated as hash chains, by hashing an 
initial value several times.  
We have simulated our protocol in four basic scenarios: first scenario is a stress 
test, which all the nodes sends connection request in a certain period of time. Second 
scenario is for testing a typical real-world case. Third scenario is a combination of these 
two scenarios, which clients make a rush in a real-world case. Fourth scenario is again a 
real-world case, but this time with three different operators and the clients are mobile. 
We ran the first scenario for different number of nodes between 100 and 600. We 
consider two cases in this scenario. In the first case, all nodes connect to their home 
operator. In the second case all nodes connect to a foreign operator. In these two cases, 
for 300 nodes end-to-end authentication latency goes below one second. Most of the 
processing delay is caused by the AP. Hence, the results are similar in both cases.  
For the real-world scenario, users start TCP sessions. TCP packets in the network 
cause longer end-to-end authentication latency. The mean latency for 40 nodes is 531 
ms in the home operator, and 551 ms for the foreign operator. Some of the connection 
request packets are dropped, because of the congestion in the network. In this situation 
connection rerequest packets are sent by the clients. Our results include latency that is 
caused by the dropped connection request packets.   
In the rush scenario, for 200 newly added nodes and 40 existing active nodes, we 
have seen average end-to-end authentication latency is increased from 429 ms to 648 
ms. Thus, we conclude that for this case that we consider, existing network traffic 
increase the authentication latency 50%. 
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Our simulations for the mobile scenario showed that mobility does not cost too 
much overhead for the performance metrics.  
The results show that, roaming processing times added to the end-to-end 
connection latency is tolerable. Active client count is the main criterion that affects 
latency.  
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